Turkish TRG-300 Offensive Missiles with a Range of 120 km in Kioneli

Turkey continues to deploy new weapon systems in the occupied territories, modernizing the Attila occupation forces and sending the message that it has no intention of withdrawing from Cyprus. This development effectively creates obstacles to the prospect of resuming negotiations and achieving a viable solution without the presence of foreign troops on the island.

Firepower Depth… and Neighboring Countries

Following the deployment of HISAR anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems, even more dangerous weapons have arrived in Cyprus. These include a battery of TRG-300 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), stationed in Kioneli, with a range of 90 to 120 kilometers! And with rapid mobility capability. In essence, the occupation forces now possess unprecedented firepower depth, capable of covering every part of free Cyprus while also controlling sea and air corridors across the region toward Syria and Lebanon. Similar TRG-300 deployments have also been observed facing Syria. This means that the strategic calculations also concern Israel, in the following sense: Turkey is strengthening its position in the event of a crisis involving Israel and the Syrian theater. Through occupied Cyprus, the threat posed by Attila extends to neighboring countries as well. What is ultimately being confirmed, not theoretically but in practice, is that Turkey’s revisionist policy is being implemented step by step. It concerns changing the geopolitical and legal relations between Turkey and neighboring states, which Ankara seeks to keep under its control through either the shadow or direct use of force.

Targets and Military Upgrading

Typically, a TRG-300 battery includes launchers, command vehicles, radar systems, communications systems, as well as reload and support vehicles. This translates into the capability for multiple strikes and rapid response during a crisis. These missiles possess terrifying accuracy because they use GPS/INS guidance systems. They are capable of neutralizing strategic targets such as:

• airports,
• military camps,
• command centers,
• infrastructure, government buildings and telecommunications,
• concentrations of critical units, etc.

The TRG-300 is primarily considered a long-range offensive strike weapon and reflects Turkey’s broader strategy in Cyprus, which is linked to: 1)The new ALP-100 self-propelled radars with a range of 185 km, supplementing early-warning systems, particularly at Profitis Elias, for detecting and neutralizing drones. 2) The HISAR anti-missile system, with a range of up to 40 kilometers. 3) The upgrading of the Attila commando regiment headquartered in Halevka into a brigade. 4) The deployment of Bayraktar and Akinci drones in Lefkoniko. 5) The naval base at Bogazi. 6) The deployment of F-16 aircraft in Tymbou.

It therefore becomes clear that the TRG-300 operates in conjunction with long-range and advanced radar systems such as the TRS/STR-700G and KALKAN-II. These systems, combined with the HISAR platforms, can detect:

• aircraft,
• drones,
• loitering munitions,
• helicopters,
• cruise missiles,
• even low-flying targets.

Each TRG-300 launcher carries four missiles, and each battery consists of approximately four to six launchers, meaning 16 to 24 missiles ready for immediate launch. A battalion with three batteries would therefore have 12 to 18 launchers in total and 48 to 72 missiles ready for immediate firing.

The “Brain”

All radar data is transferred to the “HAKIM” system, which decides which unit will undertake interception or response operations. As previously mentioned in earlier analyses, “HAKIM” is a Turkish network-centric Air Defense Command and Control (C2) system functioning as the “central brain.” It connects radars, sensors, and anti-aircraft assets into a unified network, providing a real-time aerial picture (who is flying, where, how, and what the threat characteristics are). Within this framework, it evaluates and prioritizes threats such as UAVs, aircraft, cruise missiles, and helicopters, assigning engagement orders to the most suitable available weapon system. It makes rapid decisions within seconds, avoiding duplicate engagements and coordination errors between different units. It is designed to withstand electronic warfare interference and increases the effectiveness of connected air defense systems. HAKIM cooperates with radar and electronic systems located in Pentadaktylos — at Hill 888, where the TRS-22XX radar with a surveillance radius of 500 km is stationed — as well as in Kioneli, where the STR-700G radar system with a range of 250 km is located, along with other electro-optical sensors, electronic warfare systems, and the radars of additional anti-aircraft systems deployed in the occupied territories. This entire network is connected to Turkey and, more specifically, to the HAKIM system.

Interoperability of Systems

The combination of HAKIM, radar systems, HISAR, and TRG-300 effectively creates a network-centric battlefield environment:

• the radars detect,

HAKIM coordinates,

HISAR protects,

and the TRG-300 systems, together with the corresponding T-122 multiple launchers, 18 in total with ranges from 40 to 120 km, conduct offensive individual or mass strikes against land and surface targets.

The radars are the eyes and ears, HAKIM is the brain, and the TRG-300 is the spearhead that strikes, while HISAR serves as the protective shield.

The Need to Strengthen the National Guard

Under these conditions, it becomes evident that: 1. Cyprus is one of the central pillars of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine and Turkey’s extended strategic arm. 2. The chances of Turkish troop withdrawal from Cyprus are diminishing, because Turkey is transforming the island into its own unsinkable aircraft carrier and military outpost in the Eastern Mediterranean. 3. The rapid upgrading and strengthening of the National Guard are imperative in order to establish deterrence. 4. Turkish objections to the agreements of the Republic of Cyprus with France,agreements that also include defense cooperation, are unjustified. The same applies to Israel. In other words, according to the occupation regime and Ankara, what should Cyprus do? Remain defenseless and left at the mercy of Attila? What is justified, however, is the acquisition and strengthening of BARAK anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems, as well as others, within the framework of the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

EU Policy

Furthermore, it is necessary that: First, the issue of institutionalizing a European Multinational Force (including Greece, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, already present in Cyprus and the region due to the crisis with Iran, or other willing European countries) be raised through the EU, with command headquarters at the “Andreas Papandreou” Air Base or the “Evangelos Florakis” Naval Base. If these countries do not participate, others could. Such a force could also operate on the basis of voluntary participation. Therefore, the most logical solution would be for this “Security, Stability, and Peace Force” to become part of an EU defense and security subsystem within the framework of the new defense architecture, in cooperation with the United States, which seeks to invest in the “Andreas Papandreou” base and the Mari naval facility for the completion of the helipad infrastructure. Second, the issue of the increasing Turkish threat and the occupation itself should be raised before the upcoming EU Council of Defense Ministers, promoting a policy so that a future Council of Heads of State and Government includes a paragraph referencing Article 42.7 of the EU Treaties. As is well known, Article 42.7 stipulates that if a member state is attacked, the EU and its member states are obliged to assist and defend it with all available military means. Article 42.7 is related to and combined with Article 222 of the Treaties concerning solidarity, as well as Article 51 of the UN Charter regarding the right to self-defense.

Negotiations and Questions

The second option above constitutes diplomatic and legal deterrence, while the first represents practical deterrence. Beyond these issues, another matter arises: On the 8th of the month, a new meeting will take place between President Christodoulides and the occupation leader Tufan Erhurman regarding the resumption of negotiations. How can dialogue proceed when the so-called “foreign minister” of the pseudo-state emphasizes that Cyprus’s agreement with France, including the defense sector, is provocative and will not be accepted by either the occupation regime or Turkey? As Erhurman and Ertugruloglu claim, the “sovereignty of their state” is allegedly being violated. It is further clarified that only Turkey, through its military presence, can guarantee the rights of the Turkish Cypriots on the island. In other words, Attila is entitled to arm itself, but the Republic of Cyprus, which remains under occupation, supposedly has no right to sign defense cooperation agreements with EU member states such as France. Ultimately, could it be that the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are not tools for “reunification,” but rather mechanisms for “good neighborly relations” between “two states” that would eventually sign a “founding partnership agreement” within the geopolitical framework of Neo-Ottoman expansionism?