Response to Fanoulla Argyrou’s and Leonidas Leonidou’s article of 30 July

My usual reaction is to ignore partially-informed, convoluted and promiscuous attacks, but since Argyrou has decided to attack my paper ‘Cyprus and Kissinger: Killing the Myth’ in public, I am constrained to put the record straight. I do admire her enthusiasm in hunting out documents, even if she seems to choose files and facts that serve a preconceived position, thereby playing down or even ignoring some of the documents that I have excavated. She does not mention the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, which published my article. Oddly, although the title of the article refers only to Argyrou, she uses ‘we’ throughout. Thus this response addresses both Argyrou’s and Leonidou’s article.

I find the beginning obtuse, confused, confusing and (presumably inadvertently) misleading: I could hardly ‘substantiate a “myth” against Kissinger’. Quite the opposite: I set out to destroy the myth, circulated by Kissinger’s apologists, that Kissinger was not responsible for the Turkish invasion and de facto partition of the island. In fact, he played a leading rôle, as I have amply demonstrated through documents in several of my books and articles. Moreover, there is nothing ironic in my abstract, and Argyrou and Leonidou offer no explanation for this contention.

They are obviously promoting the view that only the British determined policy for Cyprus and are responsible for the partition. This is naïve balderdash: as early as 1957, it was the USA which insisted that Britain release Makarios from the Seychelles. Since at least 1956 and the Suez crisis, Britain’s rôle in the Middle East has been as Washington’s butler. The 1960 arrangement that led to a manacled form of independence was predicated on a NATO solution via the British bases (which Makarios, to his credit, did his best to whittle down). After 1963-64, Washington (read NATO) had effectively taken over lock, stock and barrel. This does not mean that Britain had no rôle, but it was one that required clearance from Washington. From when the Americans introduced the ‘Ball Plan’, Britain was constrained to consult with them, and even to let them make the running, and increasingly so after the 1967 debâcle. Argyrou and Leonidou need to be aware of the following. So here goes.

Internal documents show that from 1963, Britain was bent on divesting itself of its responsibilities, particularly the Treaty of Guarantee, having begun to question the viability of the bases. In 1967, the Law Officers even admitted that the Cyprus Government’s contention that the Treaty of Guarantee was contrary to Article 2.4 of the UN Charter and completely overridden by Article 103 was ‘not without force’.

Grivas became increasingly a thorn in the side for Makarios, particularly since Britain had started contacts with him through his right-hand man, Eliades. In the early Seventies, the High Commissioner even wrote that one day Britain might be obliged to deal openly with Grivas, particularly since (in line with American interests), he had written that should Britain help him to achieve union with Greece, the bases would be safe, since they would used for the ‘defence of the free world.’ On Grivas’ death in January 1974, Makarios became a bigger threat for Washington and Kissinger than before, but with the Foreign Office nevertheless trying – or pretending to itself- to go by the book. Grivas’ extremist EOKA B and nationalist elements in the increasingly unstable Greek junta were planning to take over through violence, since Makarios was far too popular and skillful to be defeated by democratic means.

As for Makarios’ escape, Britain’s main concern (in line with Kissinger’s) was to delay by a vital day Makarios’ arrival in London and then New York. He was forced to stay the night in Malta under false pretences. Had she read my books, she would know this.

As for the following, Argyrou and Leonidou also seem not to be fully briefed:

On 17 July, but before the fateful meeting that evening in London between the British and Turkish Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and other government officials, the UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, weighed in, putting the British slightly on the spot, as can be inferred from a flash telegram from the British Mission to the UN in New York:

1. The Secretary-General asked to see me [Ivor Richard, British UN Representative] à deux today about the possibility of the Security Council deciding on enforcement action to restore Makarios’s government.
2. Waldheim said that he though it likely that the Council would, within the next 48 hours adopt unanimously a resolution calling for the restoration of the legal government. It might not deal with the means to enforce this action. But, at some stage, the council might go on to decide on such action. It was clear that, with only some 2,000 troops on the island, UNFICYP was in no position to take effective action on its own. The obvious place to look for reinforcement was the British Government, which already had troops in the Sovereign Base Area and could presumably reinforce them discreetly over the next few days. Following Security Council authorization, British troops could move from the SBA’s to reinforce UNFICYP in action to reverse the coup. They would be under UN command and probably under a non-British force commander.
3. It was however probable that the very threat of such action involving the promise of British military power being deployed would lead to a swift Greek withdrawal and probably the collapse of the Nicosia regime.

An immediate withdrawal of the Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard and even the mere threat of military action under the Treaty of Guarantee was of course precisely what Kissinger was working against, using what some might construe as specious arguments, such as that the Greek officers had acted as a force against communist infiltration. Serious action would deprive the Turkish government of the excuse it was seeking in order to invade. Were constitutional normality restored, it would make an invasion impossible. Therefore, the longer the Sampson regime could be kept in power, the better from Turkey’s and Kissinger’s point of view. All eyes were now focused on the British-Turkish meeting that night. It turned out to be a damp squib, but a dangerous one, since Britain actually refused to take joint action with the Turks, thereby giving the latter the excuse they were seeking to invade. Britain, quite rightly, sought a tripartite meeting, but the Turks clearly resisted this. A relevant extract of the record of the meeting reads:

The Prime Minister asked if the problem for Mr. Ecevit [Turkish Prime Minister] was a political one with his own Parliament: that he could not sit down with the Greeks. Mr. Ecevit conceded that this was one factor.

Turkey’s excuse was rather shallow since, (according to the Commander of British Forces Near East), ‘Turkey […] was fast talking herself into military intervention to protect the allegedly beleaguered Turkish Cypriot community. That they were in fact in no danger and that Turkey had no genuine pretext for military intervention is well illustrated by Mr. Olver’s [British High Commissioner, Nicosia] telegram.’ The latter had written on 18 July: ‘I have no (no) evidence of any immediate threat to the Turkish Cypriot community. There have been no attacks on the community during the past few days. The Turkish Cypriot Minister of Defence, Mr Orek confirmed to a member of my staff this morning that the Greek Cypriot Community, and in particular the National Guard, had been behaving with admirable caution: there had been a few minor casualties through bullets straying inadvertently across the Green Line, but in general the Turkish Cypriot Community had no cause for complaint in this respect.’

It is also clear that Britain could have threatened to reinforce the UN contingent from its bases, and had the wherewithal to do so, but preferred to hide behind Kissinger’s delaying tactics and express obfuscation.

A ‘Top Secret’ minute of 17 July from John Killick, the Deputy Under Secretary, to Alan Goodison, Head of Southern European Department, recording a meeting that morning between Callaghan and officials, suggests British readiness to intervene militarily.

On the operational side the MOD said the Greek [sic] National Guard was 10,000 strong with light tanks, artillery and heavy equipment. They could mobilise a further 30,000. Existing British forces in the SBAs could cope with them. In reply to questions however it was explained that this was a defensive assessment. If British forces were to be used offensively, it was thought the Chiefs of Staff would need reinforcements provided for under present plans – a Brigade Headquarters and two battalions (probably the spearhead battalion from the UK already at 72 hours notice and the Commando embarked in Hermes). In reply to the direct question whether it would be militarily possible to restore Makarios to power, the provisional answer was probably Yes if the only opposition was the National Guard, but the MOD would probably want to put in ‘a lot more’ as an insurance.

1. Much would depend on the attitude of the population and the extent of a possible internal security problem. This was difficult to assess. EOKA (B) had only 200 armed men at the last count.

But meanwhile, Kissinger was active on the telephone, one of his favourite diplomatic tools. In a revealing comment on his modus operandi, the British Ambassador to Washington, Ramsbotham, wrote after a telephone conversation with Kissinger on 17 July 1974:

My conversation with Kissinger was apparently not recorded in the State Department and we have just received the somewhat bizarre request that we should give the gist of it to Sisco [the US Assistant Secretary of State who was to shuttle furiously from capital to capital, firefighting] before he leaves for London […] I fear it is all too likely, given Kissinger’s idiosyncratic methods of working, that he may not record the telephonic conversation he has with the Secretary of State. I hope therefore that you can arrange for the gist of these to be telegraphed to me as soon as possible […] oth­erwise, improbable though it may seem, I fear there will be a danger of both the State Department and this Embassy working in the dark with all the resultant risks of confusion and misunderstanding.

Kissinger seemed puzzled as to why we were working to move so quickly and in such absolute support of Makarios […] it was surely a mistake to commit ourselves now to Makarios and thus narrow our options when it was far from certain that Makarios could return to power. Kissinger was also concerned at the line we were taking about the withdrawal of Greek officers in the National Guard. Whatever role they had been playing, they had at least acted as a force against communist infiltration in Cyprus. Kissinger was clearly suspicious that Makarios, returned to power in those circum­stances, would not hesitate to regard the Russians as his saviours and allow an already strong communist party to gain further strength […] he hoped we could agree to play the hand more slowly.

This shows clearly that Kissinger was playing for time; trying to keep Makarios out of the picture; and, crucially, supporting the National Guard, when it had itself been used to spearhead the coup. He disagreed with the British view that the Greek officers in the National Guard should be withdrawn. Here, the reason was clear: to encourage Turkey to invade. Interestingly, unlike the FCO, which was of the view that Maka­rios outside Cyprus might move closer to the Soviet Union, Kissinger apparently thought the precise opposite, namely that if restored to power, Makarios would regard the Soviet Union as his saviours. Whether Kissinger genuinely believed this, or was using the ‘Communist threat’ argument to prolong the crisis, must be left to you, the reader. In any event, he now clearly had doubts about Sampson’s cred­ibility, and wanted Clerides (the President of the Cypriot Parliament) to take over from Makarios.

All this was happening while Turkey was blatantly preparing to invade Cyprus, without any tri-partite talks. Kissinger’s delaying tactics, before, during and follow­ing the invasion are brought into bizarre relief in a message he sent to Callaghan just after the Turkish landing on the night of 19 to 20 July:

[…] here is the message you and I discussed. It is for your scrapbook. I was about to send it to you when our Ottoman friends cut loose […] it is essential that we work closely together in all of this so that we do not set in motion any train of events before we have a precise view of what we want to achieve […] if pressure from the outside should be brought to bear to restore Makarios, this will only solidify the regime in Athens.

Apart from the obvious stalling tactics, the argument that Makarios’ return would ‘solidify the regime in Athens’ is particularly specious, since it could equally be argued that Makarios’ return would hasten the régime’s downfall. In any case, first, Kissinger gave no reasoning to support his contention and, second, the régime was on the point of collapse, regardless of Makarios’ position. As it was, Constan­tine Karamanlis, in ‘exile’ in Paris, must already have been preparing to return to Athens.

Two days after the first stage of the Turkish invasion, Kissinger was, bizarrely, still doing all he could to allow the Turkish military as much breathing and attacking space as pos­sible: on 22 July, he telephoned Callaghan at 5:00 p.m. (GMT), only nine hours before Sampson resigned, to say that the Americans did not want Sampson as the final outcome, but that before they turned on him they wanted to see what the ‘gen­eral package looked like.’ Even more blatantly, when Ramsbotham asked Kiss­inger on 23 July ‘how he saw the next moves,’ the latter replied that he would like to procrastinate until he could see clearly how the forces were balanced. By this time, notwithstanding the differences of opinion on Makarios’ status, the British govern­ment was moving into tandem with Kissinger: Ramsbotham told Kissinger that the British government approach (to the impending conference in Geneva) was similar to the USA’s. Even on the question of restoring Makarios to power, the British were not sticking to their guns, particularly since their High Commission in Nico­sia had reported that the local repercussions of Makarios re-establishing himself in Cyprus as president ‘would be extremely dangerous.’ This judgment had of course been made while Sampson and the National Guard were still in control. Neverthe­less, the British appear to have been happy to let the Americans make the running. Kissinger was now in charge, followed by a grateful Callaghan, who had, as the documents show, seriously considered preparing British forces for combat. The fact also remains that despite Kissinger’s denials about giving the Turks the ‘cantonal idea’, British documents confirm that it was in fact the Americans themselves who had ‘fed the Turkish delegation with the cantonal idea’.

Argyrou and Leonidou also need to grasp that one of the reasons that Makarios took rather long to return to Cyprus was that the Karamanlis government was still settling in, having to contend with the Greek military and the courts. Karamanlis also feared taking actions that would irritate Washington, and hoped that Makarios would be kept out. Documents show that Kissinger did his best to keep Makarios out, but then gave up. When Makarios did return, he referred in a private conversation to Clerides as ‘that traitor’.

Are Argyrou and Leonidou aware that Callaghan actually lied to the Parliamentary Committee? Herewith an extract of the record of Callaghan’s and his minders’ appearance before the Committee, on 19 February 1976. Callaghan was accompanied by Alan Goodison, Head of Southern European Department, Derrick Burden, Head of Claims Department and John Freeland, Second Legal Adviser.

Mr. Rees-Davies: […] That being so, Ecevit having left London and gone back, there was in fact the first Turkish invasion which took place on the 20th July at that time of what were described in that communiqué of yours as abortive discussions with the Turkish representatives. That having obtained, at least you recognized, did you not, that there was to be an immediate invasion by the Turks into at least northern Cyprus at that time and that that was imminent?

Mr. Callaghan: No.

[…]

Mr. Rees-Davies: When you had the first Geneva Conference and communiqués were signed on the 30th July, at that time there was no indication that the Turks were withdrawing because reports were still coming through that they were increasing their hold in Northern Cyprus; that is right, is it not?

Mr. Goodison: It is true that immediately after the signature of the Geneva Declaration the Turks did move forward a little, but the substance of the Declaration was that they were going to stop, and it involved the delineation of the cease-fire lines which was to proceed between the two conferences. We expected that the lines would become stabilised after the first Geneva Conference.

Mr. Rees-Davies: That is right. You expected it but, in fact, events did not turn out that way. They still continued to indicate that there was a real danger of further advance, did they not?

Mr. Callaghan: No, I do not think that was indicated at all.

A few days later, on 26 February, the FCO compounded the lie in a telegram to Nicosia:

You may as necessary deny that HMG had any advance intelligence about the coup or the invasion and say that I denied this to the Select Committee.

Yet, as Argyrou and Leonidou surely know from documents revealed in my books, Callaghan had advance knowledge of both stages of the Turkish invasion.

It is hardly surprising that the Committee concluded: Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation to intervene, she had the military capacity to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons which the government refuses to give.

Why was Callaghan advised to lie? The answer is surely obvious: first, he was being groomed for the premiership, and second, his telling the truth would have embarrassed the Americans.

The fact is that Kissinger would not countenance the British using force, as a result of which British policy was (and still is) subsumed into American policy; to speak of Britain being in charge of policy on Cyprus is a fantasy. It is all about the bases and NATO. Whatever the potential negotiating problems with Ankara, Britain tried hard to give up its bases, but was pressurised by Kissinger not to do so, on the excuse that Cyprus was important in the Arab/Israel dispute.

The following extracts, taken from a 1975 policy paper, demonstrate clearly that Britain was not in charge:

1. (a) British strategic interests in Cyprus are now minimal. Cyprus has never figured in NATO strategy and our bases there have no direct NATO role. The strategic value to us has declined sharply since our virtual withdrawal from east of Suez. This will remain the case when the Suez Canal has reopened.

(b) The US Government are firmly attached to the view that withdrawal from our bases in Cyprus would have a destabilizing effect upon the Eastern Mediterranean, with implications for the Middle East. We do not believe that it would have any significant effect on Arab/Israel relations; its effect on the relations between Turkey, Greece and the Alliance would depend on the circumstances in which it took place. Dr Kissinger in particular is anxious that we should “continue to occupy this square of the world chess board”, we do not any longer seek such a world role. [The FCO has excised a sentence here, under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958]

Although our preferred policy is for a complete British military withdrawal from Cyprus, we recognize that we cannot do so at present, given the global importance of working closely with the Americans. So long as this remains the case, it is important for us to avoid attempt [sic] by others to make us withdraw or to attach unacceptable conditions to our retention of the bases.

[…]

But our involvement in the Cyprus crisis has stemmed not so much from the question of the bases as from our role as a guarantor power. Given our decision not use military force in Cyprus and the relatively small amount of pressure we can bring to bear upon Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, this puts us in the invidious position of having responsibility without power. This has brought us no advantages whatsoever and it must be in British interests for us to work for a solution which will not involve Britain in any guarantee obligations or other lasting commitments over Cyprus. Such a solution is however remote and will be particularly difficult to achieve as long as we retain a physical presence in the Bases.

[…]

It is also in our interests to work for such a solution of the Cyprus problem as would enable us to withdraw from the Treaty of Guarantee. We should also work, as far as possible, for a change in US policy which would permit us to withdraw from the Cyprus Bases in circumstances which would endanger our relations neither with the US nor with Greece, nor Turkey.

[…]

We should also recognise that in the final analysis Turkey must be regarded as more important to Western strategic interests than Greece and that, if risks must be run, they should be risks of further straining Greek rather than Turkish relations with the West.

Yet only six years later, the importance of British (i.e. American) strategic interests on Cyprus had been turned on its head, with the advent of Thatcherism: a senior FCO official wrote at the end of 1980: The benefits that we derive from the SBAs are of major significance and virtually irreplaceable. They are an essential contribution to the Anglo-American relationship. The Department have regularly considered with those concerned which circumstances in Cyprus are most conducive to our retaining unfettered use of our SBA facilities. On balance, the conclusion is that an early ‘solution’ might not help (since pressures against the SBAs might then build up), just as breakdown and return to strife would not, and that our interests are best served by continuing movement towards a solution – without the early prospect of arrival.

This explains poignantly why British policy on Cyprus, and indeed the Middle East, is essentially American, and why Kissinger’s introduction of the ‘BBF’ continues to bedevil the situation. Callaghan aided and abetted Kissinger.

Had Britain handed Cyprus to Greece in 1947, as she nearly did, then we would not be where we are today. I hope that Argyrou and Leonidou can at least agree with that. As to their apparent insinuation that Makarios was a Turkish stooge and had given his ”consent” to James Callaghan on the 17 July 1974 for the British to work with Turkey” to invade, this is conspiratorial codswallop, unless their agenda is to distract attention from the fact that the whole farrago was agreed by Kissinger and Callaghan, both of whom they wish to exonerate, while attacking the one man, Makarios, who survived all the attacks, and whose legacy still keeps Cyprus from becoming a complete Anglo-Saxon and Turkish military tool.

I quote the British High Commissioner to Cyprus in 1966: Makarios has the intellectual abilities, which would enable him to make his mark in a country of a hundred times the population. His mind is both clear and agile. He is a good psychologist and, although he sometimes cannot keep back a trace of arrogance, he is good at managing men […] For a Greek, he is astonishingly undevious […] I do not believe that he has ever told me a deliberate lie […] perhaps because he thinks such a thing beneath him.

To conclude my response to Argyrou’s and Leonidou’s attack, I was intrigued as to why they did not comment on my introduction, on my exposing Kissinger’s apologists, and, above all, on the highly critical and disparaging comments about Kissinger by senior British, French and American diplomats which I uncovered. Finally, they need to understand that cherry-picking certain documents is not sufficient: one needs to understand the mechanics and niceties of policy formulation as part of a process leading to a decision. In the case of Britain, her hands were tied after the Suez debâcle, by hiding behind Washington at times of crisis, while decision-making was predicated on her subservience. In this sense, Cyprus would remain a strategic cat’s paw, just as in 1878, because of the obsession with Russia, the USSR and today, again Russia.

William Mallinson

Athens,

24 August 2024