The Door Is Open for Merkava Mk3 Tanks

The door is open for the acquisition of Israeli Merkava Mk3 main battle tanks by the Cypriot government, which have been tested in operations such as the 2006 war in Lebanon and in Gaza. Information indicates that Nicosia is in continuous communication with Tel Aviv, not only regarding the Merkava Mk3, but also for the coverage of the low-altitude air defense layer with specific weapons systems, in order to counter Turkish drones and protect the BARAK anti-missile and air defense system.

Air Defense and Drones

Beyond covering the needs for tanks, what is being pursued in practice is the creation of an “Air Defense Dome,” which does not exist today, but its construction is being planned and is expected to be built gradually and steadily. These issues are related to modern warfare, particularly that involving drones and loitering munitions (circulating munitions) or, as they are called, “kamikaze drones,” which constitute a major threat, especially to tanks, something that was demonstrated both in the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the war in Ukraine. For this reason, even tank technology is evolving in terms of their protection, with key players in this field being the Russians and the Israelis.

Leopard-1A5 and Inflated Prices

The Merkava Mk3 are, in practice, better than the LEOPARD-1A5, for which reports had surfaced about their transfer from Greece to Cyprus and their partial modernization by a factory that would be located on the island. Official sources state that no such decision has been made, particularly regarding the construction of such a facility, and at present there appears to be no such prospect. It was a discussion that took place for the immediate coverage of the needs of the National Guard, and Greece offered, if Nicosia so wished, to provide from its reserves the older LEOPARD-1A5. Although the National Guard may face problems, since over the years multiple efforts and related upgrade programs that had been planned did not materialize, due to various reasons not relevant at present, government sources emphasize that no rushed decisions will be taken, nor decisions that would serve various interests. Nicosia is concerned about the involvement of indirect intermediaries and their identity, as it is observed in several cases that purchase prices are elevated, if not inflated… And this, despite the agreement being concluded on a government-to-government (G2G) basis.

The Background of the Merkava Mk3

The background of the Merkava Mk3 is recorded as follows: 1. It was used in Southern Lebanon in 2006, in the war against Hezbollah, and, although there were losses, it proved to be a robust platform in operations on difficult terrain. 2. In practice, it demonstrated very good crew protection and the ability to survive anti-tank attacks effectively, particularly in an urban environment. 3. It is, like all tanks, vulnerable to ATGMs, which stands for Anti-Tank Guided Missiles. They are launched from the ground, a vehicle, or a helicopter. They are highly accurate and “fire and forget.” That is, the missile has its own “eye,” a thermal camera, locks onto the target and guides itself to destroy it. The Merkava Mk4 has been significantly improved, but the Merkava Mk3 is also being modernized, and those that have not been upgraded can be upgraded. In any case, the Merkava Mk3 is a heavy and rugged tank. It may not be as agile as the French LECLERC tanks, in which the National Guard had shown interest, but it is combat-proven, for terrain in Israel and Lebanon that is similar to that of Cyprus and not like that of Europe. The problem with the LECLERC, as well as the Merkava Mk4, is the high cost. The French market in particular has a very high maintenance cost. The issue is not only the purchase of a weapons system, but also, in the long term, the cost of maintenance, and in general the uninterrupted logistical support chain and the continuous flow of ammunition, as well as political considerations. 4. It has a front-mounted, American-made engine, which increases the survivability of the crew against frontal anti-tank fire. In this regard, while the U.S. embargo against Cyprus was in place, there was a problem, although Netanyahu himself had guaranteed that he could resolve it, as indeed happened. In essence, for the purchase of the Merkava Mk3 by Cyprus, there had been the “blessing” of the Americans for about two years.

On the Battlefield and the Trophy System

The fact that the engine of the Merkava Mk3 is positioned at the front: A) It provides space at the rear for 4 to 6 soldiers, which constitutes an advantage on the battlefield, offering on-field solutions that facilitate the conduct of intense operations across a variety of combat environments, both offensive and defensive, particularly in urban settings. At the same time, it provides the capability for rapid rotation or replacement of a wounded crew member, local external security, use in terrain where the tank’s mobility is restricted, combat rescue, transport of wounded personnel, equipment, or additional ammunition, etc. It has enhanced crew survivability capabilities. This is a fundamental principle of the Israelis on the battlefield. B)The front part of the tank is constructed with particularly strong and reliable armor and is equipped with a turret carrying a highly accurate 120mm gun, with the capability of firing on the move. The armor is complemented by the modern self-protection system “Trophy,” the effectiveness of which has been proven in combat operations, prompting the Americans to adopt it for the M1A2 Abrams tanks. It is a similar system, but more advanced than the one used on the T-80 UK of the National Guard, which intercepts anti-tank missiles and creates a local protective dome around the tank by combining optical imaging and magnetic emissions, with the aim of intercepting and deflecting the incoming missile. In the case of “Trophy,” the interception is active. That is, it detects and destroys the threat before impact by launching an explosive/fragmentation countermeasure. Moreover, it is not limited to missiles, but also neutralizes anti-tank rockets (e.g., RPGs), which it destroys in the air at a short distance from the tank. It then identifies the enemy’s position and provides data to the crew for an immediate counterattack with fire directed at the source of the launch. The Israelis have already proceeded with integrating the “Trophy” system not only on main battle tanks but also on other equipment, including critical command assets. In any case, such a development is also within the plans of the National Guard, which is concerned by observing the continuous upgrading of “Attila” in the occupied areas, a fact that necessitates the upgrading of our armed forces so that Cyprus can maintain a credible deterrent.

Timing and Geopolitical Factors

The discussions for the acquisition of the Merkava Mk3 reach the highest level, that is, between Nikos Christodoulides and Benjamin Netanyahu. The problem that had arisen regarding the fastest possible delivery of the Israeli tanks to Cyprus was the crisis in Gaza and subsequently the war in Iran. However, the problem is not insurmountable, as the crisis in Gaza has been concluded, although there is now Israeli involvement in Lebanon. On the one hand, crises always exist in the Middle East; on the other hand, the tanks to be provided to Cyprus are from reserve stock. In addition, the issue of timing and delivery can be arranged gradually and through phased training.

Additional Strategic Motivation

Israel has an additional incentive to support Cyprus, since Turkey constitutes a threat to it as well, particularly through the occupied areas. When the Turks arm the occupied territories in both quantity and upgraded quality, they do not have in mind only the free south of the Republic of Cyprus, but also the wider region and especially Israel. The stance of Ankara is evident, particularly in this period in which it maintains a neutral, pro-Iranian position, always targeting Israel. On the other hand, one of the many lessons from the war in Iran is that, without autonomous defense, a state cannot endure. Iran is not the United States, but it has a credible deterrent, otherwise it would have collapsed. And we, on our side, may not be Turkey, but we must have the most credible deterrent possible, so that the cost to the enemy is greater than any potential benefit. The consolidation of deterrence in small states is, in practice, a matter of alliances, such as the existing ad hoc cooperation with European countries, which should be institutionalized within the framework of the European Union, as a security subsystem in the Middle East with the participation of the United States, which is already present at the “Andreas Papandreou” base.